All posts by Charlie Bilello

The Less Traveled Road to the 200-day Moving Average

Since November 2012, the S&P 500 has remained above its 200-day moving average for 421 consecutive trading days, the longest streak in history. I have compared this streak in the S&P 500 to the Joe DiMaggio hitting streak in 1941 for its incredible consistency and resiliency.

200-day 7-28-2

The so-called “path of least resistance” has been up and if you are a long-term trend-follower focused on large cap U.S. equities, this has been the best period in history for your strategy. But no trend lasts forever and strategies come into and out of favor over time as the market environment changes.

I know it has become blasphemy to question this historic advance, but I am wondering aloud here if we are about to take the road less traveled, that is the one back to the 200-day moving average as the market environment is slowly changing. Last week, as the S&P 500 hit yet another all-time high, there were a growing number of red flags that indicate that the probability the streak may soon be in jeopardy is at its highest point since it began in November 2012.

Let’s have a look:

Credit

The credit markets are showing signs of weakness for the first time in months. High Yield credit spreads have been consistently widening since late June and are close to a 3-month high. This has been a minor move higher in spreads thus far, but as credit typically leads, one that should not be ignored.

200-day 2

European credit spreads have also been widening, notable in my view as we are seeing this credit weakness in the face of what was supposed to be a highly positive event: a move to negative interest-rate policy. As I questioned recently, what is it telling us when negative rates are not enough?

200-day 3

Small Caps

Small Cap weakness has been a nagging red flag this year and it continued last week as the Russell 2000 closed out the week at its 200-day moving average. In a stark divergence from the all-time highs in the large cap indices, the Russell 2000 is actually down year-to-date. The weak behavior in the average U.S. stock is being masked by the strength in the largest stocks.

200-day 4

Similarly, breadth did not confirm last week’s new highs with the NYSE Advance/Decline peaking back in early July.

200-day 5

Housing

We are also seeing persistent weakness in housing, with homebuilders down over 7% on the year and hitting new relative lows last week. It is notable that this weakness has persisted in spite of a decline in yields this year and in spite of the market not expecting the Fed to raise rates for at least another year.

200-day 6

 Late-Cycle Sector Behavior

As I have noted in writings showing the many parallels to 2007, we continue to see late cycle sector behavior with Energy/Utilities leading the market higher while the most cyclical sector, Consumer Discretionary, is lagging. You rarely want to see this type of defensive backdrop this late in the economic cycle. The persistent strength in Utilities is particularly notable because it tends to precede more difficult market environments, as we outlined in a research paper earlier this year.

200-day 7

In the past two weeks, I have also noted the divergent behavior in the cyclical Industrials sector, which hit new relative lows and failed to hit a new high with the S&P 500 last week. The last two corrections, in 2011 and 2012, were both preceded with Industrial  sector weakness.

200-day 8

Yields Falling

Long duration (30-Year) bond yields have been falling for the entire year, and hit a new YTD low last week at 3.2%. This behavior indicates that investors are seeking out the safety of Treasuries, likely anticipating more difficult times ahead.

200-day 9

It is not simply that yields are falling that is a problem, but the behavior within the Treasury market as well. The Yield Curve hit new YTD lows last week as the demand on the long end is outpacing demand on the short and intermediate end of the curve. This defensive behavior tends to precede more difficult market environments, which we wrote about in another research paper this year.

200-day 11

The Less Traveled Road to the 200-day

Collectively, the market is sending signals of caution while the large cap indices are hitting new highs. In markets, we deal with probabilities, never certainties, and the probability of the S&P 500 finally taking the less traveled road to the 200-day is rising. That probability is not anywhere near 100% but it is high enough to warrant our attention, particularly as we approach the end of QE in October (see Fed Prisoner’s Dilemma) and as long-term stock/bond returns are unattractive at current valuations/yields (see Has the Fed Doomed Buy and Hold?).

Does this mean that the bull market that began in March 2009 has to come to an end? No, and as I have written many times in the past, picking an exact top is impossible and not particularly helpful to long-term investors. What it will mean is that we are returning to a more normal market environment where corrections exist and risk management matters. Such an environment should favor more active, tactical management.

For our part, we rotated to a more defensive posture last week in our mutual funds and separate accounts. It remains to be seen if the red flags outlined above will persist, but as long as they do the long-term probabilities favor defense over offense.

This writing is for informational purposes only and does not constitute an offer to sell, a solicitation to buy, or a recommendation regarding any securities transaction, or as an offer to provide advisory or other services by Pension Partners, LLC in any jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation, purchase or sale would be unlawful under the securities laws of such jurisdiction. The information contained in this writing should not be construed as financial or investment advice on any subject matter. Pension Partners, LLC expressly disclaims all liability in respect to actions taken based on any or all of the information on this writing.

CHARLIE BILELLO, CMT

Edward M. Dempsey Pension Partners New YorkCharlie Bilello is the Director of Research at Pension Partners, LLC, an investment advisor that manages mutual funds and separate accounts.  He is the co-author of two award-winning research papers on Intermarket Analysis. Mr. Bilello is responsible for strategy development, investment research and communicating the firm’s investment themes and portfolio positioning to clients. Prior to joining Pension Partners, he was the Managing Member of Momentum Global Advisors, an institutional investment research firm. Previously, Mr. Bilello held positions as an Equity and Hedge Fund Analyst at billion dollar alternative investment firms, giving him unique insights into portfolio construction and asset allocation.

Mr. Bilello holds a J.D. and M.B.A. in Finance and Accounting from Fordham University and a B.A. in Economics from Binghamton University. He is a Chartered Market Technician (CMT) and a Member of the Market Technicians Association. Mr. Bilello also holds the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) certificate.

You can follow Charlie on twitter here.

facebooktwittergoogle_pluslinkedinmail  rssyoutube

Related Posts:

  • No Related Posts

Has the Fed Doomed Buy and Hold?

In December 2008, the Federal Reserve embarked upon the most expansionary monetary policy in U.S. history.  In an unprecedented action, the Fed moved its Federal Funds Target Rate to a range of 0% to 0.25% and began its first ever “Asset Purchase Program,” better known as Quantitative Easing (QE). At the time, these extraordinary measures were deemed “necessary” by most to save the world from financial “Armageddon” and prevent a second Great Depression.

Nearly two years later, in November 2010, the Economy was back in expansion mode (the official end of the recession was in June 2009) and financial conditions had stabilized. This would normally be around the time when the Federal Reserve would start talking about or initiating a tightening of monetary policy. However, this time the Fed had other intentions, as Ben Bernanke outlined in an op-ed that shocked the world.

In his November 2010 op-ed, Bernanke made the case for additional QE and an extended period of low interest rates. His justification was that such a policy would lead to:

(1)    “Easier financial conditions”

(2)    “Lower mortgage rates”

(3)    “Lower corporate bond rates,” and

(4)    “Higher stock prices”

Fast forward to today and what do we observe?

Easier Financial Conditions

Financial conditions are near their loosest levels in history.

Doom1

Lower Mortgage Rates

Mortgage rates hit historic lows and remain near their lowest levels in history.

Doom2

Lower Corporate Bond Rates

Junk bond yields are at their lowest level in history.

Doom3

Higher Stock Prices

U.S. stock prices are at all-time highs.

Doom4

Mission Accomplished?

Whether you believe it was a result of their policies or not, it is difficult to argue with the notion that the Fed has largely achieved the objectives outlined in Mr. Bernanke’s November 2010 op-ed.

While this has undeniably been a boon for investors over the past five years, the question today is what achieving those objectives means for investors going forward. Judging by the record levels if bullish sentiment of late, investors seem to be assuming that the future will look very much like the recent past, but is this a valid assumption?

By forcing bond yields to all-time lows and increasing stock prices to all-time highs, has the Fed repealed the laws of valuation and mean reversion or simply pulled forward returns? Let’s take a look.

Pulling Forward Returns – Bonds

The 10-Year U.S. Treasury yield is currently at 2.4%. Historically, there has been a very close relationship between the beginning yield on the 10-Year Treasury and the forward returns from bonds funds. This is simple bond math; on average, the higher the beginning yield, the higher the return and vice versa. You can see this clearly in the chart below. While we don’t have enough history yet for yields below 3%, investors should expect returns to be well below anything they have seen in the past.

Doom5

That is the critical issue investors are facing here. By maintaining interest rates at artificially low levels for over five and a half years, the Fed has effectively driven yields on nearly all fixed income products to historical lows. The reach for yield has entered the desperation phase in recent months as investors have grown tired of waiting for the Fed to raise interest rates.

From Treasuries to mortgage-backed securities to investment grade bonds to high yield bonds, yields on average have never been lower. The current yield on the iShares Core U.S. Aggregate Bond ETF (AGG), which is designed to approximate the total U.S. bond market, is 2.0%.

With this low starting level of yield, can investors really expect to achieve a nominal return from bonds of above 3-4% annualized over the next seven years? It is difficult to argue that they can. And this is assuming that interest rates could remain low going forward. As we saw in 2013, if interest rates rise from here, the actual returns are likely to be lower.

Pulling Forward Returns – Stocks

Moving on to stocks, we unfortunately observe a similar picture where forward returns have been pulled forward by Federal Reserve Policy. At a current cyclically adjusted P/E (CAPE) of 26 for the S&P 500, we are approaching the 90th percentile of historical valuations. There are few times in history where we have seen a higher valuation and none of these periods were favorable for equities going forward.

Doom6

While not a short-term predictor, forward returns from CAPE levels above 26 have been significantly below average in the past. In the chart below, you’ll notice the strong relationship between beginning CAPE valuation and future returns. If we approximate the 90th percentile by taking a simple average of the 7-year annualized returns from the two top deciles of CAPE levels (4.8% and 2.5%), we come to a forward expected return of roughly 3.7% for U.S equities.

Doom7

Has the Fed Doomed Buy and Hold?

After five and a half years of unprecedented action, the Federal Reserve has largely achieved what they set out to do: namely inflate asset prices. We can debate whether this has actually led to a real economy “wealth effect” as they implied it would, but the historic rise in asset prices here is unquestionable.

That has certainly been great news for investors in their retirement years that are cashing out of investments at their highs. But for anyone not cashing out, it remains to be seen if this was indeed the best outcome. Mathematically, it would seem suboptimal to buy at elevated prices if you are adding additional funds to your retirement savings each year, as Warren Buffett has said in the past:

“If you expect to be a net saver during the next 5 years, should you hope for a higher or lower stock market during that period? Many investors get this one wrong. Even though they are going to be net buyers of stocks for many years to come, they are elated when stock prices rise and depressed when they fall. This reaction makes no sense. Only those who will be sellers of equities in the near future should be happy at seeing stocks rise. Prospective purchasers should much prefer sinking prices.” – Warren Buffett

Buffett focuses on stocks, but a similar argument could be made for bonds, whereby forcing net savers to buy into bond funds at artificially low yields is likely to diminish long-term returns.

Much like the Fed-induced housing bubble that peaked in 2006, only those few homeowners who cashed out during the latter stages of the bubble actually benefitted from the bubble. Anyone else was hurt by it, either existing homeowner through rising property taxes (as taxes in most areas are based market values) or new homeowners who were forced to buy in at overvalued prices if they wanted to participate in the “American Dream.” We’ll leave the speculators buying five condos in Miami out of this but they of course suffered as well.

Doom8

Thus, the problem facing most investors today is that the short-term gains that they have readily enjoyed in recent years have not been realized, and they also do not come without a price. There is no “free lunch” in the markets and the price to be paid from higher returns in the recent past is lower returns in the future.

The Federal Reserve, through five and half years of zero-interest rate policy and various rounds of quantitative easing, has effectively doomed the buy and hold investor to a period of low returns. With bond yields near historical lows and stock valuations near historical highs, it is difficult to argue otherwise for a typical buy and hold stock/bond portfolio in the coming years. In fact, a low single digit return would not be unprecedented given current yields and valuations.

Buy and hold is often touted as the best strategy for most investors. It hard disagree with this notion, as investors are notoriously poor market timers, with the behavioral tendency to buy high and sell low. That said, like any strategy, there are times when the market environment is more and less favorable to buy and hold. When prospective returns were high as they were in 2009, it was a great time to be a buy and hold investor. You want constant beta exposure when valuations are cheap.

But fast forward to today and we have an entirely different backdrop, where constant beta exposure is almost guaranteed to deliver below average long-term returns. In my view, such an environment is more favorable to active or tactical management, as was the case back in 2007. I am well aware of the derision that such strategies are facing today, as this has been one of the best periods for buy and hold in history. But this is precisely why they are more favorable going forward. No one wanted buy and hold in March 2009 and everyone wanted to be “tactical.” The opposite is true today.

The Pushback:

1) The market can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent.

This is one of the most overused and misused phrases in investment history. Solvency is not an issue in this analysis as I’m not writing about making an LTCM or Corzine type of bet. I’m also not suggesting that it is a good idea to short the market simply because it’s overvalued. There is a big difference between being cautious/defensive and being bearish/short. I’ve written extensively this year about how being defensive in 2014 has cost you nothing, with the two most defensive areas of the market, Utilities and long duration Treasuries, widely outpacing the average U.S. stock.

What I’m discussing here is asset allocation and for the majority of investors, who are not using short-term levered instruments, solvency is not a concern. What should be a concern for these investors is how the short-term irrationality going on today is going to lead to lower returns going forward.

2) But Jeremy Grantham says that the S&P 500 is going to 2250. Doesn’t that disprove your thesis?

While a long-term value investor, Grantham is one of the best promoters in history. There is a reason why his firm is managing over $100 billion. He knows that investors love forecasts and precise numbers and he is giving them exactly what they want. While 2250 target is making headlines, if you read the rest of the piece his projections are not far from my own, and may even be more cautious as he is arguing for negative real returns from a U.S. stock/bond portfolio over the next seven years. He is also suggesting that U.S. small caps may be at their most overvalued levels in history, with projected real returns of -5% per year over the next seven years. This is ingenious marketing as Grantham has put himself in a position where he cannot be wrong. If there is a bubble, his 2250 target will be easily hit and if there’s a bear market before that, well, he warned you that small caps were at extremely dangerous levels. Heads or tails and he wins.

But I digress. The 2250 forecast is a short-term forecast and the analysis here is focusing on longer-term returns. It is certainly possible for the market to continue to march higher in the coming months and I would note that Grantham’s forecast is only 13% above current market values. However, should it do so, that would only lower expected returns even more. Again, if you are not going to cash out on that rise but will be adding money to your 401k/IRA, shouldn’t you prefer a short-term decline back to more reasonable valuations over another late 1990’s bubble?

3) But the Federal Reserve is projected to keep interest rates low for at least another year. Won’t this cause even more of a reach for yield and higher bond prices?

It is certainly possible and I can only conclude that this must be the Federal Reserve’s objective by continuing with ZIRP after five years into a recovery and record low Junk bond yields. But again, is this the preferable outcome for a long-term investor that is continuing to add money to bond funds each month? Wouldn’t more normalized, market interest rates be more beneficial to most investors?

I would also note that investors are unlikely to wait to the very end of QE and ZIRP to begin making adjustments as I wrote about recently in “The Fed Prisoner’s Dilemma.”

4) This only talks about U.S. investments. Can investors boost long-term returns by moving abroad?

Yes. I have been making the case for much of this year that Emerging Market stocks and bonds are significantly cheaper and offer better prospective returns than the U.S. when looking out over the next seven years. The problem, though, is that most U.S. investors are unlikely to have enough exposure to these areas to make a difference to their portfolios due to home bias and recency bias. The other issue is that the interest rate suppression is a global phenomenon and while bonds in Emerging Markets are more attractive on a relative basis, yields are still historically low.

5) Can’t valuations remain high and yields low for the next seven years?

They could, but I would ask what probability you are assigning to that outcome and what your expected return from stocks and bonds would be in that scenario. If average bond yields are still 2.0% seven years from now, can you make the case that bond returns will be much higher than 2% in that scenario? Similarly, if the CAPE is at 26 seven years from now, can you make the case for strong equity returns based on earnings growth alone when nominal GDP is currently running at between 3-4%? The “permanently high plateau” theory has rarely been a good strategy for long-term investors.

5) What would change your outlook?

Buy and hold is not doomed forever. Markets are cyclical. Though it seems unlikely because we are conditioned by the recent past, there will be better valuations and higher yields in the future. If you are a long-term investor that is adding to your savings and investments each month, you should not fear this inevitability but should welcome it.

This writing is for informational purposes only and does not constitute an offer to sell, a solicitation to buy, or a recommendation regarding any securities transaction, or as an offer to provide advisory or other services by Pension Partners, LLC in any jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation, purchase or sale would be unlawful under the securities laws of such jurisdiction. The information contained in this writing should not be construed as financial or investment advice on any subject matter. Pension Partners, LLC expressly disclaims all liability in respect to actions taken based on any or all of the information on this writing.

CHARLIE BILELLO, CMT

Edward M. Dempsey Pension Partners New YorkCharlie Bilello is the Director of Research at Pension Partners, LLC, an investment advisor that manages mutual funds and separate accounts.  He is the co-author of two award-winning research papers on Intermarket Analysis. Mr. Bilello is responsible for strategy development, investment research and communicating the firm’s investment themes and portfolio positioning to clients. Prior to joining Pension Partners, he was the Managing Member of Momentum Global Advisors, an institutional investment research firm. Previously, Mr. Bilello held positions as an Equity and Hedge Fund Analyst at billion dollar alternative investment firms, giving him unique insights into portfolio construction and asset allocation.

Mr. Bilello holds a J.D. and M.B.A. in Finance and Accounting from Fordham University and a B.A. in Economics from Binghamton University. He is a Chartered Market Technician (CMT) and a Member of the Market Technicians Association. Mr. Bilello also holds the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) certificate.

You can follow Charlie on twitter here.

facebooktwittergoogle_pluslinkedinmail  rssyoutube

Related Posts:

  • No Related Posts

The Fed Prisoner’s Dilemma: Sell Now or Keep Dancing?

“When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.” – Chuck Prince, July 10, 2007

[Joe Kernen: You have been on Squawk Box and said as long as -- you sound like Chuck Prince. You're still dancing now basically. Until they raise rates you're going to dance, right?

Stan Druckenmiller: First of all, I'm not like Chuck Prince because I can get out. I am still dancing, but Chuck Prince and the Fed, if they're wrong, cannot get out. I can get out in a week.] – CNBC, July 17, 2014

Some of you may be familiar with game theory and the famous example of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the game, two members of a criminal gang are arrested, imprisoned, and isolated. They have two options: 1) cooperate with one another (stay silent), or 2) betray one another (testify that the other committed the crime). The various payoffs for each decision can be seen below.

PD1

The dilemma is as follows. From a purely self-interest perspective, it is in each prisoner’s best interest to defect as they have the opportunity to go free with the other party serving 3 years if other party stays silent. However, as both prisoners are likely to pursue this self-interested option, they are collectively worse off, with each prisoner receiving 2 years in jail. Had they cooperated and remained silent, they would have each served only 1 year in jail, the best possible combined outcome.

The Fed Prisoner’s Dilemma

Many market participants today are faced with a similar dilemma, and they have become prisoners, in recent months, to Federal Reserve policy. After five and a half years of 0% interest rates and three rounds of QE, returns on virtually all asset classes have been pulled forward. This is precisely what the Fed intended to happen as Ben Bernanke made clear in his famous “wealth effect” Op-ed in 2010.

It is debatable whether there has indeed been a “virtuous circle” as Bernanke suggested, where higher stock prices were supposed to “spur spending” and “lead to higher incomes and profits.”

What is not debatable is that bond yields are at/near all-time lows while stock prices are near valuation highs. This suggests that forward returns from here are likely to be significantly below average. As such, market participants are becoming increasingly reliant on the Federal Reserve to maintain the status quo, and to not pullback from unprecedented measures even five years into a recovery. For if asset prices are elevated in large part because interest rates are artificially low, it stands to reason that if interest rates are no longer held down asset prices will have to fall.

The dilemma today is as follows. We know that the end of QE3 is fast approaching in October, as the Fed indicated in its most recent minutes. We also know that following the end of QE1 in 2010 and QE2 in 2011 we saw correction of 17% and 21% respectively in the S&P 500.

PD2

It is impossible to quantify how much of a premium the market is trading at with the psychological support of QE underneath it, but let’s assume based on the action in 2010 and 2011 that it is at least 15% higher than it would otherwise be.

Now, we know that institutional investors are not oblivious to this and we also know that they understand that valuations are getting stretched at current levels. In a recent poll of investors, Bloomberg found that 47% of those surveyed believed the equity market was close to “unsustainable levels” while 14% already saw a “bubble.” In the high yield bond market, it the results were even more alarming, with 70% of those surveyed saying the rally in junk-rated bonds was “in a bubble or close to one.”

PD3

Source: Bloomberg Poll

Two Hedge Fund Managers Walk into a Bar

Say we have two hedge fund managers and they are the only active market participants: Hedge Fund Manager A, let’s call him Davy Tepper, and Hedge Fund Manager B, let’s call him Billy Ackman.

Davy and Billy are both heavily long equities and well versed in QE and what happened in 2010 and 2011. While they are both still very bullish on equities, they do not like drawdowns and neither do their investors. They are aware of each other’s existence but are isolated in the sense that they don’t speak to one another before they make a trade.

What are their options here with the equity markets at all-time highs and the end of QE fast approaching? They can 1) remain heavily long (dance until the music stops) and wait until the end of QE to sell, or 2) cheat and sell early while the music is still playing.

A theoretical payoff diagram is below. If Davy and Billy cooperate and stay long, they can have a nice, orderly sell-off at the end of QE with a 5% drawdown. However, Davy doesn’t like 5% drawdowns and neither does Billy. They both would prefer a 0% drawdown and have the other fund suffer a 15% drawdown. They would look like heroes in that scenario. By acting in their own self-interest and selling early, though, they will end up suffering more than had they cooperated, each incurring a 10% drawdown.

PD4

Now I realize that this is a wild hypothetical and many ridiculous assumptions are involved, but let’s think this through for a second.

If one wanted to cheat and sell early what would be the main risk? A market that continued to move higher whereby one would miss out on gains, of course. As we all know, the cardinal sin in hedge fund investing is missing out on upside, even it’s in the very short term. If everyone is down and you’re down too, that’s fine; but if you’re flat when everyone else is up that’s a one-way ticket back to the sell-side.

How to Keep Dancing Without Going to Cash

Is there a way that one can sell early without suffering the consequences if the market continues to rally for some time? Sure, by subtly adjusting one’s beta, or reducing one’s risk. And if I wanted to reduce risk without other funds knowing about it, I would do three things:

1) Move out of more illiquid/higher beta small and micro caps and more liquid/lower beta large caps,

2) Move out of more cyclical sectors like Financials and Consumer Discretionary and into more defensive sectors such as Utilities, and

3) Move into one of the most defensive asset classes, long duration Treasuries.

If we look at the markets in 2014 we can clearly see that many funds are likely already cheating in some form.

First, as I wrote about last week, there is a glaring divergence between large and small cap stocks, with the S&P 500 and Dow still hitting new all-time highs while the Russell 2000 and Russell Microcap indices are down YTD.

PD5

PD6

Second, we are seeing classic late cycle behavior within sectors, with the defensive Utilities sector outperforming while the cyclical Financials and Consumer Discretionary sectors are underperforming. As I wrote about last week, this behavior bears an uncanny resemblance to July 2007.

PD7

Lastly, we are seeing a persistent bid in one of the most defensive asset classes: long duration Treasuries (TLT).

PD8

Not only are they outpacing US equities YTD, but the yield curve has been flattening the entire year, an additional signal of defensiveness within the Treasury market.

PD9

One Foot out the Door

Whether you subscribe to my  Fed game theory or not,  it is important  to recognize what the market is telling us. In no uncertain terms, the big money investors are already preparing for more difficult times ahead with “one foot out the door” rotations into lower beta areas of the market. They may not be going to cash as they still fear missing upside, but they are certainly not going to wait for the end of QE to reduce risk in their portfolios.

Many investors will disregard this message that the market is sending, as they are probably thinking that they are like Drukenmiller and “can get out in a week.” Perhaps, but if the events following 2000 and 2007 have taught us anything, investors are much more likely to overstay their welcome than to sell early. There is now only 100 days left until the Fed’s October meeting where they are expected to announce the end of QE. What will you do?

This writing is for informational purposes only and does not constitute an offer to sell, a solicitation to buy, or a recommendation regarding any securities transaction, or as an offer to provide advisory or other services by Pension Partners, LLC in any jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation, purchase or sale would be unlawful under the securities laws of such jurisdiction. The information contained in this writing should not be construed as financial or investment advice on any subject matter. Pension Partners, LLC expressly disclaims all liability in respect to actions taken based on any or all of the information on this writing.

CHARLIE BILELLO, CMT

Edward M. Dempsey Pension Partners New YorkCharlie Bilello is the Director of Research at Pension Partners, LLC, an investment advisor that manages mutual funds and separate accounts.  He is the co-author of two award-winning research papers on Intermarket Analysis. Mr. Bilello is responsible for strategy development, investment research and communicating the firm’s investment themes and portfolio positioning to clients. Prior to joining Pension Partners, he was the Managing Member of Momentum Global Advisors, an institutional investment research firm. Previously, Mr. Bilello held positions as an Equity and Hedge Fund Analyst at billion dollar alternative investment firms, giving him unique insights into portfolio construction and asset allocation.

Mr. Bilello holds a J.D. and M.B.A. in Finance and Accounting from Fordham University and a B.A. in Economics from Binghamton University. He is a Chartered Market Technician (CMT) and a Member of the Market Technicians Association. Mr. Bilello also holds the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) certificate.

You can follow Charlie on twitter here.

facebooktwittergoogle_pluslinkedinmail  rssyoutube

Related Posts:

  • No Related Posts